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ABSTRACT 
Network-centric quantum communications (NQC) - a new, scalable instantiation of 
quantum cryptography providing key management with forward security for lightweight 
encryption, authentication and digital signatures in optical networks – is briefly 
described. Results from a multi-node experimental test-bed utilizing integrated photonics 
quantum communications components, known as QKarDs, include: quantum 
identification; verifiable quantum secret sharing; multi-party authenticated key 
establishment, including group keying; and single-fiber quantum-secured 
communications that can be applied as a security retrofit/upgrade to existing optical fiber 
installations. A demonstration that NQC meets the challenging simultaneous latency and 
security requirements of electric grid control communications, which cannot be met 
without compromises using conventional cryptography, is described.  
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
 
Trends in networking are presenting new security concerns that are challenging to meet with 
conventional cryptography, owing to constrained computational resources or the difficulty of 
providing suitable key management. In principle, quantum cryptography [1] with its forward 
security and lightweight computational footprint [2] could meet these challenges, provided it 
could evolve from the current point-to-point instantiations to a form compatible with multi-node 
networks [3, 4]. Trusted quantum key distribution (QKD) networks [5, 6, 7, 8] based on a mesh of 
point-to-point links lack scalability, require dedicated optical fiber, are expensive and not 
amenable to mass production, only provide one of the cryptographic functions (key distribution) 
needed for secure communications, and so have elicited limited practical interest. We have 
experimentally demonstrated a new, scalable approach to quantum information assurance called 
network-centric quantum communications (NQC), and have shown that it can solve new network 
security challenges in the critical infrastructure control sector, in particular.  
In NQC, BB84-type quantum 
communications (QC) [1, 9] between each of N 
client nodes and a central server node at the 
physical layer support a quantum key 
management (QKM) layer, which in turn 
enables secure communications functions 
(confidentiality, authentication and non-
repudiation) at the application layer 
between	~ N2 client pairs [
10]. (See Fig. 1.) The NQC “hub-and-spoke” 
topology is widely encountered in optical fiber 
networks, and permits a hierarchical trust 
architecture that allows the server (the “hub”) to 
act as the trusted authority (TA, “Trent”) in 
cryptographic protocols for quantum 
authenticated key establishment (QAKE). (This 
avoids the poor scaling of previous approaches 
that require a pre-existing trust relationship 
between every pair of nodes.) By making Trent 
a single multiplexed QC receiver, and the client 
nodes (Alice, Bob, Charlie, etc.) QC 
transmitters, NQC amortizes the cost and 
complexity of one of the most demanding QC 
components – the single-photon detectors – 
across multiple network nodes [11]. In this way 
the NQC architecture is scalable in terms of 
both quantum-physical resources and trust.  
The photonic phase-based qubits typically used in optical fiber QC require interferometric 
stability and inevitably necessitate bulky and expensive hardware. Instead, for NQC we use 
polarization qubits, allowing the QC transmitters – referred to as QKarDs - to be miniaturized and 
fabricated using integrated photonics methods [12]. This opens the door to a manufacturing 
process with its attendant economy of scale, and ultimately much lower-cost QC hardware. Our 
Fig.	1.	Network‐centric	quantum	communications	
(NQC)	architecture.	(See	text	for	details.) 
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first-generation, modularly-integrated QKarD is a fiber-coupled device, similar in size to an 
electro-optic modulator, which incorporates a distributed 
feedback laser and modulator, that produces short 
(< 1ns), 1,550-nm weak-coherent (mean-photon 
number < 1), decoy-state, BB84 polarization-state light 
pulses at a 10 MHz repetition rate in our NQC test bed. 
(See Fig. 2.) This device is produced by a small-scale 
manufacturing process and could be incorporated into 
end devices. (Our next-generation, monolithically-
integrated QKarD will be an order of magnitude smaller 
in each linear dimension.)  
Trent, the NQC receiver, incorporates passive 
polarization analysis, with four cooled Geiger-mode 
InGaAs single-photon detectors, one for each BB84 
state, operated at a typical detection efficiency of ~ 15%, 
a dark count probability of ~ 10-5 per 1-ns time-slot, and 
an after-pulse blocking time of ~ 50 s applied to all four detectors after any detection. In our 
NQC test bed, which we have operated continuously for 2.5 years, we have time-multiplexed 
Trent with three QKarD transmitters, Alice, Bob and Charlie, over 50 km of single-mode fiber; 
larger numbers of clients could be accommodated with a combination of temporal and 
wavelength multiplexing. Fiber birefringence necessitates polarization tracking and compensation 
[13], which in our test bed is performed in-band (1,550-nm) at Trent, temporally multiplexed with 
the BB84 signals, resulting in a QC duty cycle of 20%. (When implemented out-of-band we 
expect our novel tracking scheme [14] will compensate even the much higher polarization rates 
that will be encountered in challenging environments such as aerial fibers [15].)  
We operated several BB84-type QC protocols on each client-Trent link in our test bed. We 
have implemented three-level, decoy-state [16, 17, 18] verifiable quantum secret sharing (QSS) 
[19] over fiber spans as large as 50km between a client and a single, logical Trent node, which is 
comprised of two physical nodes: an intermediate, integrated-photonics BB84 modulation node 
and a BB84 receiver node [20]. In this way a client’s key is split between the two physical parts 
of Trent, so that compromise of either one of the two would not compromise the key [21]. 
(Splitting of the key into additional shares would be possible with more intermediate nodes.) 
However, for brevity we will describe a simpler test bed configuration in which a three-level 
decoy-state QKD protocol, with mean-photon number signals of ~ 0, 0.1 and 0.5, is performed on 
the client-Trent links.  
Each client uses true random numbers for decoy selection and BB84 basis and bit values. (In 
future versions we will use an integrated photonics quantum random number generator known as 
Velocirandor, which is capable of rates well in excess of the 5 Gbps already demonstrated [22].) 
Following sifting and shuffling, QKD reconciliation is accomplished with LDPC codes, privacy 
amplification [23] with Toeplitz hashing [24], and authentication [25] with cryptographic CRC 
hash functions. (We have also demonstrated that a QKD authentication key can be generated 
using a quantum identification protocol, QID [9], rather than pre-placing it. Further, QID 
provides a mechanism for client device enrollment and revocation [26, 27].) In one instantiation 
we have implemented the bi-directional classical communications parts of the QKD protocol 
using commodity 1,310-nm 1000Base-LX optical communications on the same fiber, with the 
majority of the bandwidth available for applications, forming a standalone quantum-secured 
communications (QSC) system. (Our QSC co-existence/filtering architecture permits sufficiently 
low sifted bit error rates (BER) for QKD up to 50 km of fiber.) The QKD data processing is 
handled by PCs at each node, with Trent’s software architecture capable of accommodating up to 
100 client QKarDs on that platform, and more than 1,000 with server-class hardware [28]. We 
have demonstrated that the processing software in each client can be transitioned to a field-
Fig. 2. Generation 1 quantum smartcard
or QKarD. (See text for details.) 
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programmable gate array (FPGA), providing further miniaturization for use cases such as hand-
held device security.  
Following the generation of shared secret keys between each client and Trent using QKD (or 
QSS), NQC protocols at the QKM layer provide keys for client-to-client secure communications 
at the application layer [27, 29]. For example, suppose Alice requires a secret key to encrypt a 
message to Bob using the AES algorithm [30], and/or authenticate the message using the HMAC 
algorithm [31]. (Other symmetric key encryption/authentication algorithms could be used 
instead.) For definiteness, we assume that this is a 256-bit key. First, Alice and Trent parse the 
results of their QKD session into three 256-bit keys: KA, LA and MA. Similarly, Bob and Trent 
parse the results of their QKD session into 256-bit keys KB, LB, and MB. The key KB is going to 
become the key that Alice will use for securing her communications to Bob using the following 
QAKE procedure, reminiscent of the Leighton-Micali (LM) protocol [32]. Trent publishes the 
non-secret pair key, PAB = LAKB and confirmation key, AAB = H[KB || MA], where H is a 
cryptographic hash function such as SHA-256 [33], and “||” denotes concatenation of bit strings. 
Alice can then obtain the key KB that she needs to communicate to Bob by calculating PABLA. 
She can confirm that she has the correct key by calculating H[PABLA || MA] and verifying that it 
equals the value AAB provided by Trent. This second, key confirmation step is essential for 
security against malicious manipulation of PAB. Similarly, Bob would derive the distinct key, KA, 
for securing his messages to Alice. Note that important security advantages of QAKE in contrast 
to LM are that: it does not require pre-placement of long-term secret keys shared by a client and 
Trent; and each new client-to-client key has no algorithmic heritage in any previous key. Trent 
could even go offline after publishing a look-up table of clients’ pair keys and confirmation keys, 
and the clients would still be able to execute the above QAKE protocol using previously-
generated, and securely-stored quantum keys. 
A quantum digital signature (QDS) protocol [27] allows Alice to sign messages to Bob based 
on the Winternitz one-time signature (WOTS) scheme [34], which uses repeated cryptographic 
hash evaluations to calculate and verify signatures. Alice requires a secret signing key, S, to 
calculate her signature, and Bob requires Alice’s non-secret signature verification key, V. In QDS 
Alice’s S key is one of the keys she shares with Trent through QKD. Trent can calculate V from 
S, and provide it to Bob, authenticated with one of the Bob-Trent QKD keys. When Bob receives 
the signed message from Alice he can then verify her signature using V. Each Alice-Bob message 
requires a new signing key, which in QDS is generated from Alice-Trent QKD. This is an 
important advantage of QDS relative to conventional WOTS schemes that require pre-
computation and pre-distribution of large Merkle trees for verifying signatures on multiple 
messages. As with QAKE, QDS has forward security, providing fresh signing keys instead of the 
pre-placed, algorithmically-related keys of the analogous classical protocols. With the inclusion 
of the digital signature capability, NQC can provide the full functionality of a public key 
infrastructure [27]. 
Energy delivery systems such as the SmartGrid have requirements for the secure, low-latency 
(~ few ms) delivery of data from, and commands to, control devices [35]. In the electricity 
transmission sector there is for example, a low-latency data origin authentication [36] 
requirement for the multicast of phasor measurement unit (PMU) data to phasor data 
concentrators (PDC) [37]. Analyses have shown that these two requirements cannot be met 
simultaneously with present-day cryptography on commodity processors [38], without 
compromising either the security assurances or the quality-of-service: RSA signatures [39] are 
too slow, for example; while message authentication codes using a common group key are 
vulnerable to compromise of a single node. (Similar security/latency requirement mismatches 
exist throughout the electric grid.) Newer, lightweight cryptography could meet the requirement, 
but with conventional approaches the key management would be impractical [38]. However, 
optical fiber is widely-deployed throughout the electric grid, and so NQC with its essentially 
unconstrained ability to supply fresh, forward-secure keys on-demand is capable of supporting 
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lightweight cryptography [40] for these applications. Furthermore, our single-fiber QSC 
configuration has the highly desirable feature that it can be inserted as a “bump-in-the-wire” 
security retrofit into existing grid communications. In December 2012 we demonstrated these 
advantages of NQC in the US Department of Energy’s Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the 
Power Grid (TCIPG) test bed at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) [41]. (See 
Fig. 3.) With the TCIPG test-bed configured to simulate both normal and fault conditions in the 
electric transmission grid, our QSC system secured the PMU-PDC communications over a 25-km 
fiber link with only ~ 125 s of additional latency, exceeding requirements by almost two orders 
of magnitude [42]. This result convincingly demonstrates the value that NQC offers for solving 
the pressing cyber security challenges of critical infrastructure protection. Other NQC use cases 
include: handheld device security; enterprise network security; and secure cloud computing. 
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Fig. 3. Test configuration using the Los Alamos (LANL) QSC system to 
secure PMU control commands and data. The TCIPG test bed provided a 
real-time digital (power) simulator, PMU, and PDC software to control 
and display data from the PMU. (See text for details.) 
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